The current global financial crisis has necessitated a questioning of some of the fundamental theories and assumptions, particularly the free-market theory, on which regulationofbusinessenterprises,includingmultinationalcorporations(MNCs),havebeen based.Specifically,intheareaofcorporatesocialresponsibility(CSR),thispaperexplores two crucial issues. The first is the implication for our understanding of the obligations of corporations to CSR in light of the scale of impacts on ordinary citizens, and their role in bailing out failed banks which owed them no direct legal obligations. The second is the continued reliance on a voluntary framework for CSR. Just as the financial crisis resulted from the largely unregulated nature of global financial institutions, this paper demonstrates, through various country examples in the resources sector, that the unregulatednatureofCSRobligationsonMNCshashaddireeffects,comparabletothatof the financial crisis, on populations. If corporations have, through personal greed and irresponsibility,evidentlyfailedtoeffectivelyregulatethemselvesevenintheircoreareas ofbusinessnecessaryfortheirownsurvival,howmuchlessdoweexpectofeffectiveselfregulationintheareaofCSR? A.Introduction The current crisis in the global financial markets has left consequences that transcend national boundaries. Rising defaults on sub-prime mortgages in the United States of Americatriggeredaglobalfinancialcrisis,resultinginthecollapseofmanyoftheworld's leadinginvestmentbanks. 1
BBC
News, 'Timeline: Global credit crunch' (20 October 2008), available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7521250.stm. Corporations,CSRandSelfRegulation has been severally described as the 'worst financial crisis in decades.' 2 World leaders, particularly those from developed nations, have met several times in an attempt to harmonize methods to remedy the global financial predicament. The steps taken so far include interest rate cuts, capital injections, and lending guarantees to restore liquidity, revivetheailingbankingsystemandrebuildinvestors'confidenceinanefforttoboostthe financial markets.
3 While the governments of some countries have provided colossal amountsofmoneytobailoutbaddebtsincurredbyfinancialinstitutions,centralbanksin the US, Canada and some parts of Europe took the unprecedented step of co-ordinating cutsininterestratesinanefforttoeasethecrisis. 4 Thispaperpositsthattheimpactsof the financial crisis on ordinary citizens reveal their vulnerability to issues they have no controlover.Morefundamentally,itquestionsthefundamentaltheoriesandassumptions, particularlythefree-markettheory,onwhichregulationofbusinessenterprises,including multinationalcorporations(MNCs),havebeenbased.Specifically,intheareaofcorporate social responsibility (CSR), it has crucial implications for our understanding of the obligationsofcorporationstoCSRandthevoluntaryapproachuponwhichitisbased.This paperarguesthatjustasthefinancialcrisisresultedfromthelargelyunregulatednatureof global financial institutions, the unregulated nature of CSR obligations on MNCs has had direeffectsonpopulations,especiallythoseaffectedbythefinancialcrisis,thatordinarily donotderivedirectbenefitsfromtheMNCs.
In developing this argument, the paper will first give a brief background analysis of the implicationsofthecurrentcrisisonthetheoreticalbasisforfree-marketeconomicsupon whichlaxregulationofcorporationshassofarbeenbased,notingthefocusondomestic regulation. Thereafter, it demonstrates that this lax regulation transcends the financial 3 BBCNews(note1). 4 The Bush administration in the US provided an initial US$700bn bail-out to buy up Wall Street's bad debts in returnforastakeinthebankswhiletheUKgovernmentannounceditwouldmake£400bnextracapitalavailable to eight of the UK's largest banks and building societies in return for preference shares in them. These figures have since ballooned both in the US and the UK as banks write down more losses with some on the brink of collapse.TheObamaadministrationhassinceproposedafurther$825billion'stimulus'packagewhichCongress passedwithvariousamendments.TheUKGovernmentonitspartprovidednotonlyfurther'bail-out'fundsfor thebanks,buttooksubstantialstakesinnotablehighstreetbankssuchasLloydsTSB,RoyalBankofScotlandand HBOSaswellas'reinsuring'alltheir'toxicdebts'.SimilarstepshavebeentakenbymostoftheotherEuropean andSouthEastAsiancountries,includingChina,whichproposeda$585Billion'stimuluspackage'.Theextentof thisrecessionisyettoplayitselfoutasmorejoblossesareannounceddailywithmorecompaniespreparingfor bankruptcies. G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l system by exploring the attempts at regulation of multinational corporations at international law, highlighting the invariably soft law approach. This is followed by evidenceoftheinefficacyofthisapproach,especiallyinlightofweaknationalregulatory systems in developing countries and the difficulties associated with gaining access to foreignforums.Thisishighlightedwithexamplesfromonecountryeachfromsub-Saharan Africa,theAsiansub-continentandLatinAmerica.Thefinalsectionexplorescriticallythe coreargumentofthepaper.
B.TheoreticalBasisforFree-MarketEconomicsandtheCurrentGlobalFinancialCrisis
Structuralism and neo-liberalism, which is an extension and redefinition of classical liberalism, previously the economic and political orthodoxy of most countries' business environments especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 5 The structuralist thesis holds that governmentshaveanimportantroletoplayinrespondingtomarketfailures,whicharea generalfeatureofanyeconomywithimperfectinformationandincompletemarkets.
6 This is because market failures are pervasive and creating a fair and an enabling business environmentisfarmorecomplexthanprovidingthebasicmarketinstitutionsforbusiness operation. The structuralists further posit that no effective competition or pro-poor outcomescanbeachievedwithoutgovernmentinterventionincorrectingpossiblecauses ofmarketfailures.
7
Structuralism(neo-Keynesianconsensus)startedlosinggroundstothe current dominant neo-liberal orthodoxy in the 1970s as a result of the inflationary and other macroeconomic distortions in the industrial economies and the public's dissatisfaction with the neo-Keynesian policies at that time. 8 Besides, the elections of Margaret Thatcher in Britain (1979) , Joe Clark in Canada (1980), Ronald Reagan in the United States (1980) , and Helmut Kohl in Germany (1981), favoured the neo-liberal ideology. The failure of some centrally planned economies in the 1980s further gave the impetus for the dominance of neo-liberal ideology as the basis for the world's business environment.Subsequently,thetwoconceptsof'efficiency'and'marketforces'anchored on the new classical paradigm became the driving forces in the propagation of the free Similarly, while studies indicate that states differed in the extent to which "marketforces"werereliedontocoordinatecorporateactivities,withsomemarketbased economies being more strategically coordinated owing to historical and institutional factors(e.g.Germany) 10 itisnowarguedthatintheageofglobalization,andconsequent liberalization,thereisincreasingconvergence.
11
The neo-liberals assume that factor markets work efficiently without government intervention if property rights and competition are guaranteed. They considered government interventions as less efficient than market-based solutions. The neo-liberal school stresses that government interventions hamper private sector development and that government should concentrate on improving the enabling business environment through deregulation.
12
Furthermore, the neo-liberal thought is based on the classical conditionsofperfectmarketcompetitionwhichseektoextricategovernmentofitsrolein thecontrolofeconomicactivitiesthatwouldallowmarketforcestofunctionfreely.Itcalls forthereductionoftaxes,divestmentsinstate-ownedenterprises,greaterprimacyofthe private sector in resource allocation, the deregulation of the labour markets and the reduction in the scope of social safety nets. 13 It was claimed that economies protected from international trade competition will have firms that operate at sub-optimal small scalesinthedomesticmarketandtheonlywaytoensureefficiencyisbythegovernment pullingbackitsinstrumentofeconomiccontrol.
14 Based on the neo-liberal ideology, McKinnon and Shaw challenged the conventional structuralistorthodoxyofgovernmentinterventionbyhighlightingthenegativeeffectsof "financial repression" on economic growth and development. . G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l repression to be the set of government legal restrictions preventing financial intermediaries in the economy from functioning at their full capacity. The distortion of domesticfinancialmarketsthroughmeasuressuchasceilingsoninterestratesandcredit expansion, selective allocation of credit, and high reserve requirements have negative impact on economic growth. They suggested that positive real interest rates should be establishedondepositsandloansbyeliminatinginterestratesandcreditceilings,removal of selective credit allocation and the lowering of reserve requirements for banks by allowingmarketforcestoself-regulatethesystem.Thishaspromptedmanycountriesto implement liberalisation and deregulation of their financial markets on the recommendationsoftheWorldBankandIMF. 16 Therefore, the theory underlying self regulation and financial market governance, which also guide the activities of MNCs, is rooted in the neoliberal policy of deregulation, liberalisation and privatisation. This has resulted in the globalisation of the financial marketsandthedismantlingofthepowersofthestatetoplayanactiveroleinfinancial market activities.
17
It is assumed that financial repression distorts market mechanism through rent-seeking behaviours because economic agents are able to manipulate the machinery of the government to impose restriction on market activities for their gains. 18 Proponents of free-markets not only support the new dawn of materialism and individualism,buttacitlyencourageitasawayofinspiringeconomicdevelopment. their workers and the community in which they operate.
27
In his book titled Business in Contemporary Society: Framework and Issues, Harold Johnson described a business with 'conventional wisdom' as "….one whose managerial staff balances a multiplicity of interests. Instead of striving only for larger profits for its stockholders, a responsible enterprise also takes into account employees, suppliers, dealers, local communities and the nation."
28 Proponents have argued that any company which fails to take the above interestsintoconsiderationfailstoliveuptoitsobligationsasagoodcorporatecitizen. However, one of the challenges of using the concept of CSR in effectively promoting corporate accountability so far has been the absence of a binding regulatory framework, especially at the international level. In some developed countries, there are laws that effectively regulate various aspects of corporate behaviour. However, as corporations by definitionarecreationsofanationallegalsystemandgovernedbythatcountry'scompany orcorporationlaw,thelawsofonecountrycannotsimplybeextendedtothedomainof another sovereign country.
29
Recourse to the courts of the home state of MNCs is also quiteproblematic.Internationallaw,despiteitslimitations,thusappearstobetheobvious vehiclethroughwhichthiscanbeachieved.Thisismoresoasclassicaltheoriesandrules of international law which recognise only states as subjects of international law, appear now to be rooted in the past. (1992) whichenjoinsinter-governmentalinstitutionstobeincluded"atalllevelsfrompolicymakinganddecision-making to implementation", and Art.3(7) of the Aarhus Convention, 38 ILM 517 (1999) enjoins greater governmental efforts to increase access to information, public participation in decision-making as well as provide access to justiceinthecontextofinternationalenvironmentaldecisionmaking.
are essentially allowed to self-regulate within a framework of soft laws and voluntary codes in this quite sensitive part of their operations, which they do not deem to form a coreelementoftheirregulatoryobligations.Weexploresomeofthesoftlawapproaches to regulation in the next section, highlighting inherent weaknesses within those frameworks. They lack any implementation mechanism, monitoring process, legal mandate, or even the ability of the ILO to expel egregious violators. As Rudolph pointed out,theDeclarationreliesonpublicpressuretomotivateoffendingmemberstoaltertheir behavior. 40 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, on the other hand, are recommendations made by the Governments of OECD Member countries to ensure that theMNCsoperateinharmonywiththepoliciesofthecountriesinwhichtheyoperate.The Guidelines are part of the Declaration on international Investment and Multinational Enterpriseswhichconstitutespoliticalcommitmentstofacilitatedirectinvestmentamong OECDMembers.TheGuidelinesencouragecompaniestomitigatetheadverseimpactsof theiroperationsandadheretothesameoperatingstandardsinhomeandhostcountries. This is a significant aspect of the Guidelines, particularly as a common criticism leveled againstMNCsoperatingindevelopingcountriesisthattheirmodeofoperationsaresubstandard compared with their home countries and other developed countries. The Guidelines,thoughaninitiativeoftheOECD,aimtooperateglobally'sincetheoperations of multinational enterprises extend throughout the world'. [Vol.11No.02 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l coverage, supply chain responsibility and dispute resolution mechanism. 42 However, several weaknesses have been identified which question the efficacy of the Guidelines. 43 First, the Guidelines are voluntary. [Vol.11No.02 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l TheNormssetoutthreemodesofmonitoringcompanies'compliance.The first is essentially based on self regulation which relies on the companies' creation of a more human rights oriented culture. Secondly, the application of the Norms could be assessedthroughexternalmonitoringandverificationbybodiessuchasunions,NGOsand industrygroupsthroughuseoftheNormsasthebasisformonitoring,dialogue,lobbying andcampaigningactivitieswithbusinesses.
II.AttemptsatInternationalRegulationofMNCs
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Thirdly,theNormsmaybeenforcedthrough state institutions. This includes publicizing the UN Norms, using them as a model for business activities, and the model for strengthening and enforcing laws and regulations implementingthem. 62 Clearly, the Norms are more authoritative than the many Codes of Conduct adopted by companies,andareasignificantimprovementoverotherexistingstandards.UnlikeCodes ofConduct,theUNNormsresultfromaformal,UN-authorizedandconsultativeprocess. The process leading to the UN Norms is similar to that resulting in other 'soft law' 57 AMNESTYINTERNATIONAL,THEUNHUMANRIGHTSNORMSFORBUSINESS:TOWARDSLEGALACCOUNTABILITY8-11 (2004 standards, some of which are now seen as part of customary international law. Nevertheless,therecoursetonon-bindinglegalinstrumentsratherthanthebindingCode that was first envisaged by the UN, means that for the Norms to achieve its potential, companies have to buy into it, NGOs and other bodies have to be strong enough to effectively monitor corporate activities, and national regimes have to be prepared to implement standards under municipal law. Thus the problem of weaknesses in national institutions and poor governance in developing countries which has contributed to the environmentalandhumanrightsproblemsindevelopingcountrieshasnotbeeneffectively addressedwithinthisregime.Theglobalfinancialcrisisalsoputsindoubttherelianceon companiestoeffectivelyself-regulate.Effectiveaccesstointernationalremediesmayalso befar-fetchedsincecustomaryinternationallawtakesalongtimetoevolve,andaccessto foreign forums may not be easy. In the next section, we explore the impact of resource development in three different regions of the world even in the face of these soft law instruments.
D.NationalRegulationandCSR
The previous section examined some international attempts at regulating corporate behaviour, highlighting the recourse to voluntary and soft law initiatives. Thus, MNCs remain legally regulated by national laws of the countries they operate in. This section demonstratestheinefficacyofnationallegalframeworksinregulatingMNCsbyexamining theimpactsoftheiractivitiesor(mis)behaviouronthelocalpopulationwithoutanylegal consequences.Thisisdonethroughtheexaminationofthreecasestudies;Nigeria,Papua New Guinea and India, all developing countries where the regulatory and enforcement frameworks are characteristically weak. As a possible alternative to domestic laws and institutions,recoursehasincreasinglybeensoughttoforeignjurisdictions.However,from thedecisions,thehurdlesthathavetobeovercomeinsuchforeignlitigationsuggestthat theapproachisnotaseffectiveasitwasinitiallythoughttobe.Thus,therealityremains thatthereisinadequateregulationofMNCsunderboth'local'and'foreign'law. Community agitation against these and other oil-related issues have led to government crackdown on oil producing communities. In the process of several (government and oil company sponsored) military operations, the human rights of the inhabitantsoftheoil-richregionandhumanrightsandenvironmentalactivistshavebeen abused. 65 Theoriginsoftheongoingviolentcrisisintheregionaretraceableinlargepart totheenvironmentalpollutionandthegovernment'slackofeffectiveresponse. Amajorcauseofconcernintheregionisthattheoilcompaniesapplyloweroperational standards in Nigeria compared with their operations in developed countries. The oil companies, however, aver that their operations are legal as they adhere with local laws which prescribe the minimum legal standards that regulate their activities. While it is impossibleinapaperofthisnaturetoexplorealltherelevantlaws, 66 atthecruxofthisis the conflict between lower standards in specific regulations on the oil industry, and the more broad provision in the Petroleum Act 67 which requires oil companies to adhere to international standards; particularly the standards applicable in America and the United Kingdom.ThePetroleumAct,whichistheprimarylawthatregulatesNigeria'soilindustry, provides that oil companies' operations must be conducted in accordance with 'good oil field practice'. The phrase 'good oil field practice' is not expressly defined. However, the NigerianMineralsOil(Safety)Regulations,madepursuanttothepowersofthePetroleum Minister under section 9 of the Petroleum Act, sheds light on the interpretation of the phrase.Section7ofprovidesthat: Where no specific provision is made by these Regulations in respect thereof, all drilling, productionandotheroperationsnecessaryforproductionandsubsequenthandlingofthe crudeoilandnaturalgasshallconformwithgoodoilfieldpractice,whichforthepurpose of these regulations shall be considered to be adequately covered by the appropriate 64 Seegenerally,EnvironmentalRightsAction/FriendsoftheEarthNigeria,GasFlaringinNigeria:AHumanRights, currentInstituteofPetroleumSafetyCodes,theAmericanPetroleumInstitute'sCodesor theAmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineersCodes. 68 The above provision expressly refers to the current oil-industry standards in the UK and USA as the standard to be adhered to by companies that operate in Nigeria. However location of its activities in a difficult environment'.
I.OilMultinationalCorporations(OMNCs)inNigeria
EnvironmentalandEconomicMonstrosity(2005).
In other cases most have been executed as a result of their environmental and human rights activities. See Patrick Okonmah, Judicial Murder of Human Rights and Environmental Activities in the Niger Delta and its ImplicationsfortheEnjoymentofHumanRightsinNigeria,7TILBURGFOREIGNLAWREVIEW4,393-428(1998).
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By the same token, the Indonesian government'recognizesthatappropriatearrangementsmayberequiredtominimizethe adverseeconomicandoperationalcostsresultingfromtheadministrationofthelawsand regulations of the Government from time to time in effect, and in construing the Company'sobligationstocomplywithsuchlawsandregulations'. 81 Ineffect,Freeportmay beexemptedfromthenormaloperationofregulationsthatwouldotherwiseregulatetheir operationsthathaveadverseeffectsontheenvironment. Thelopsidedlegalframeworkandotherinterrelateddynamicscontributetoconsequences whichincludeenvironmentalandhumanrightsdimensionssimilartothoseexperiencedin the Niger Delta of Nigeria. Abrash identifies these dynamics to include: (1) the flawed integrationofPapuaintotheRepublicofIndonesiaandsubsequentPapuanresistanceto Indonesian sovereignty; (2) the top-down, paternalistic, and non-participatory economic and social development policies and practices of the Indonesian government; (3) the counter-insurgency operations of the Indonesian military which have been carried out in order to defend Freeport's mining operations and other investment projects externally imposed upon local indigenous communities; (4)thecorruptgovernancepracticesof the Suharto regime and overall lack of the rule of law in Indonesia; (5) and Freeport management'swillingnesstooperatewithinsuchaframeworkaswellastointroduceor allow particular terms in the company's COW. 82 The communities have experienced incidences of persistent and sporadic assaults on individuals, rape, extrajudicial killings, violation of subsistence rights, restrictions on freedom of movement, interference with access to legal representation, forced resettlement of communities and killings perpetuated by the Indonesian military supported by Freeport.
83
As in the case with injured inhabitants of Nigeria's Delta region, the Amungme community has instituted proceedingsinforeigncourts.ThisismoresoasIndonesia'snationallawsdonotcomply with international standards and the government's regard of opposition to 'economic development'asacrimeofsubversion,makesgettingjusticeanarduoustask. 
III.TheBhopalGasLeakinIndia
The Bhopal gas leak in India occurred on 3 December, 1984, when large quantities of MethylIsocyanate(MIC)escapedfromoneoftheplantsofUnionCarbideIndiaLimited,a subsidiaryoftheAmericanTNC,UnionCarbideCorporation.
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Apartfromtheinitialdesign defectoftheplantandthecost-cuttingmeasureswhichfurtherrenderedtheplantunsafe, thischemicalplantwassituatedinthedenselypopulatedcityofBhopalwithapopulation ofonemillionpeople,halfofwhomwereexposedtothegasleakonthatfatefulday.The numberofdeathsresultingfromtheleakrangedbetween2,500and10,000peoplewith about40,000permanentlydisabled,maimedorlikelytosuffergraveillnessesinthefuture while about 200,000 sustained minor injuries. The long term effect of this incident on those who survived the carnage as well as damage to the natural environment is incalculable. In spite of such devastating consequences, effective enforcement has been elusivewithvictimsstillcampaigningforjusticeovertwentyyearsafter.Asanindictment of the weak regulatory framework, the first recourse for civil remedy was to a foreign forum-theUS.However,aswiththeexamplesabove,thiswasunsuccessful.Recourseto the Indian legal system was fraught with difficulties and the Supreme Court eventually entered into asettlement on termsthat were so poor thattheshare priceoftheparent company soared on the day this judgment was given. The criminal aspect of the enforcementfaredevenworse.Asaresultoftheseriousnessofthematter,theCentral BureauofInvestigation(CBI)tookovertheinvestigationbutfailedtofileanychargesuntil three years later, when charges of culpable homicide were preferred against certain individualofficialsofthecompanyundertheIndianPenalCode. further liability both civil and criminal and all pending actions were ordered to stop. However,inasubsequentreviewafterseveralcriticisms,theSupremeCourtallowedthe criminal proceedings to resume. Arrest warrants were issued for Warren Anderson, the then Chairman of the parent company, at a time when he had returned to the United States,andallattemptstoextraditehimfortrialinIndiacametonothing. ThefulfilmentoftheselatterrequirementscreatedifficultiesforATCAplaintiffs against resource-exploiting companies as CSR violations alleged often have elements of environmental and cultural rights that are not yet recognised by the courts as universal andobligatorypractice. G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l contribute to human rights violations. 104 However, it appears that the courts will allow caseswheretheallegedhumanrightsabusesareconsideredtobe'grave'andthusfallinto acategoryofhumanrightabusesitconsiderstobe'specific,universal,andobligatory'. 105 The courts also consider the applicability of the doctrines of international comity and forum non conveniens before considering whether the ATCA is the proper forum to determine the case. http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/past-cases/sosa-v.-alvarez-machain-(amicus). 105 For instance in the Wiwa case, the plaintiffs alleged through their survivors that they had been imprisoned, tortured and executed by the Nigerian government for their opposition to the defendants' oil exploration activities.Theyclaimedthatthesehumanrightsviolationswereinstigated,orchestrated,planned,andfacilitated byShellNigeriaunderthedirectionofthedefendants.Shell,thedefendantinthecase,successfullychallenged the validity of the plaintiffs' summary execution, forced exile and right to life, liberty and personal assembly claims.Thecourtallowedtheclaimsforaidingandabettingliabilityingeneral,aswellastheclaimsforcrimes against humanity, torture and prolonged arbitrary detention. weak legal frameworks and institutions. 117 Just like in the financial sector, self-regulation through the various international soft laws and company's own voluntary codes has not stoppedthesecompaniesfrombehaving'badly'. 118 Thisis,however,notsurprisinginthe faceofthecurrentcrisis.Ifintheabsenceofstrictregulations,corporationshavefailedto actresponsiblyintheareaoftheircorebusinessandintheirobligationstotheirprimary constituents (shareholders), how can they be expected to be any more altruistic in their CSRobligationswhichsomeconsidertobesecondaryoroutsideofthecoreofcorporate business? 119 Similarly, if national laws in developed countries with more efficient regulatorysystemsareunabletoefficientlyreininactivitiesofglobalcompanies,howdo we expect more from weaker national systems in developing countries? Yet, within the currentCSRframeworkbasedonself-regulation,weareexpectedtobelievetheinterests oftheordinarycitizenareadequatelyprotected. 120 The second question is whether CSR issues are sufficiently serious enough to warrant a global regulatory response? This paper has demonstrated from the emphasis on the resources industry that the impacts which range from socio-economic to environmental and cultural rights impacts are real, imminent and severe. 121 The cumulative negative impacts these industries have on the affected populations is at least comparable to (or, arguably even outweighs) the direct impacts of the on-going global financial crisis on citizens since their very lives and not just livelihoods are at stake. In the case of these affectedpopulations,theircorehumanrightsasrecognizedandpurportedlyprotectedby the international community are violated without easily accessible remedies. 122 sceptics may argue that the impacts are localised, evidence suggests that such local occurrences have global repercussions on the concerned corporation. 123 Indeed, the repercussionsmayextendbeyondtheconcernedcorporateconcerntopeoplearoundthe globe.ApointthatcomestomindishowtherestivenessintheNigerdeltaregion,linked to the irresponsible social attitude of the OMNCs (in tandem with the Federal Government) contributed to the instability in global oil prices. 124 Furthermore, the continuous gas flaring in the region during oil exploitation, which Friends of the Earth notedisthehighestintheworldin'absoluteandproportionateterms',contributestothe green house and climate change which is arguably one the world's most significant problems. 125 TheresponsestotheCSRcrisisrevealthatnotmuchattentionispaidtothe impacts of corporate actions on local communities despite their global consequences. Unliketheglobalfinancialcrisiswheregovernmentshaveralliedsupporttothefailed(and failing) financial institutions and are attempting to put global mechanisms in place to preventfuturerecurrences,thisisnotthecasewithgovernmentsindevelopingcountries where their citizens are primary victims of 'irresponsible' corporate behaviour. Rather, thesegovernments,especiallythoseinresource-richcountrieswhosenationaleconomies rely significantly, if not entirely, on the given resource, have apparently acted in collaboration with the MNCs. 126 In indicting these governments, one must recognize the enormouseconomicpowersMNCswieldoverthosecountriesinwhichtheyoperate,and indeed,internationally.
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Thisisdemonstratedeveninthecurrentfinancialcrisiswhere despite the irresponsible behaviour of financial institutions, governments in the most powerful countries have been unable to simply allow them go bust as a result of the implicationsitwillhaveonnationaleconomiesandthecitizenry. 128 Thus,whilerecognising that factors such as corruption play a role in the inaction of governments in developing countriesoverMNCactivities,itcannotbedeniedthatinsomeways,thisisastrugglefor most economies reliant on foreign investments for development of their national resources since their national economies are tied to the continuing operation of that 123 Such an international regulationcouldthenbeadoptedandthusmadeenforceableatnationallevels.Thisisnot to prejudice the case for the establishment of an international adjudicative forum. Subsidiary regulations at regional levels could be made to focus on the peculiarities of regionaldevelopmentandindustrial/sectoralpractices. RegardingthechallengesoflitigatingMNCsindomesticcourtsofhoststates;especiallyin developingcountries,thereisneedfortransnationalregulationofMNCsbythehomestate similartotheATCA.Twokeysubjectsthatneedtobeaddressedwithinthiscontextarethe conceptofseparatelegalentityandjurisdictionalaccess. The concept of separate legal entity in company law, particularly the legal relationship between holding companies and their subsidiaries, must be re-assessed vis-à-vis contemporary corporate practices. The concept of the 'corporate veil' is commonly invoked by holding companies to escape liability for offences done by their subsidiaries thatareoftenabletoescapeliabilityinthelocalforum. 134 Invariably,theplaintiffsinsuch casesareleftwithoutlegalremediesdespiteapparentharmsuffered. Jurisdictional access, that is, granting access to aggrieved persons to legal processes in a parentcompanies'hostcountryshouldalsobeoffundamentalconcern.Withoutprejudice tothesovereigntyofnationsandtheirrighttoformulatetheirownlaws,blockingaccessto courts and other judicial institutions to access remedies for legal wrongs done by their 132 EROGLU(note22),247-264. 133 AmnestyInternational,TheUNHumanRightsNormsForBusiness:TowardsLegalAccountability6-7(2004). 134 RefertosectionDabovewheretheinabilitiesoflocalregulationstoholdMNCsliablewerehighlighted.
